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Tragedy and Tragic Vision: 
A Darwinian Supplement to Thomas Van Lann 
Bert O. States 
"The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the play is; at 
the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that is the end 
forever." -Pascal, Pensée No. 210 
"One can only speak of what is in front of him, and that is simply a 
mess." -Samuel Beckett 
The debate over the death of tragedy has been a frustrating and 
sentimental affair, in Schiller's sense that we are outside looking nostalgically 
back at something that is apparently lost to us, something that was practiced 
and experienced "simply" by others who shared beliefs different from our own. 
The question is: what is supposed to be lost-the genre or the vision, or both? 
In "The Death-of-Tragedy Myth" (Spring 1991 JDTC), Thomas Van Laan 
suggests that these are inseparable things: 
Tragedy, I presume, cannot exist without the tragic vision, and I also 
presume that the tragic vision can exist only through and because of 
tragedy. (29) 
I am in general agreement with Van Laan (against the arguments of Krutch, 
Abel, Steiner, and others) that tragedy survives and that it does so, and will 
probably continue to do so, through all cultural change, but there are some 
implications in Van Laan's remark that call for a closer look, not as a critique 
of Van Laan but as another way of conceiving the problem. 
Bert States teaches dramatic theory and criticism at University of California, Santa 
Barbara. His most recent book, HAMLET and the Concept of Character, has just appeared. 
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I 
Van Laan seems to be saying that tragedy and the tragic vision are two 
distinct things that have a symbiotic relationship to each other. One is not the 
other, but one is impossible without the other. But how are they different 
things? Do they have the relationship of, say, form to content, of product to 
process, representation to theme, poem to poet (or seer)? I assume he means 
that the tragic vision somehow depends upon tragic poems, plays and novels 
as its (more or less) material foundation. But there are testaments of tragic 
vision in philosophy that barely mention tragic works, either as products of the 
vision or as a necessary source of its appearance; even if this weren't the case, 
however, it is quite possible to develop a tragic theory of human experience 
without much, or any, reference to tragic literature. Surely, then, we must 
assume the possibility that there are people in the world who are what Murray 
Krieger would call "tragic visionaries" even though they have never read or 
seen or written a tragedy.1 Improbable perhaps, but something to consider. 
Perhaps Van Laan's statement is better taken to mean that tragedy can exist 
only through and because of the tragic vision in the sense that it is the vision 
that determines the nature of the work. The visionary artist "sees" the world 
tragically and then imitates what he or she sees in a work we would call a 
tragedy. Still, this isn't right either because it suggests that all works that are 
legitimately called tragedies are necessarily informed by a tragic vision, or, 
taking visionary in Krieger's sense (and perhaps Van Laan is), that all 
tragedies have tragic visionaries as their protagonists. It is relatively easy to 
accept either of these notions in the cases of certain (but by no means all) 
tragic works by Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Shakespeare, Racine, 
Dostoevsky and Thomas Mann; but they become questionable when applied 
to Kyd, Jonson, Corneille or Dryden who wrote tragedies that do not seem, on 
the whole, to inspire reference to a "tragic vision"; nor do they seem to have 
protagonists who could be called visionaries. Finally, to take the case nearest 
to us, Death of a Salesman seems in every respect a "true" tragedy, if only 
because its author deliberately set out to write one and has as much right to 
the term as the authors of A Yorkshire Tragedy and The London Merchant. 
But something about the play suggests that Miller's "vision," not to mention 
Willy's, is far from what one might call tragic-at least in the sense that we say 
Sophocles or Shakespeare or Dostoevsky or Thomas Mann, in their foremost 
tragedies, see the world tragically. This has nothing whatever to do with the 
quality of Salesman as a play, but with the modesty of its conception of the 
origin and metaphysical depth of human catastrophe. Indeed, I wonder if any 
deliberate attempt to write tragedy, in modern or any other terms, can spring 
from a truly tragic vision. The very premeditation of such a project implies 
some other kind of orientation (social, aesthetic, reactionary), something, in 
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short, like Maxwell Anderson's attempt to bring verse back to tragedy because 
"it is inescapable that prose is the language of information and poetry the 
language of emotion."2 Can one imagine Kafka saying, "It's time we wrote 
about angst" and sitting down to write The Trial? 
This is not the issue I want to debate here. My feeling, however, is that 
tragic visionaries are not produced by social or aesthetic motives and that they 
occur more or less as the great comic, epic and religious visionaries 
occur-rarely and in single numbers. I think we are inevitably forced to 
disengage, or at least loosen, the bond between tragedy as a genre and tragic 
vision as a philosophical or a thematic standpoint. They do not necessarily 
occur together, though they are apt to be co-present and indistinguishable in 
many of the works that make up the canon of the world's great tragedies. All 
that we can say with some assurance is that there is something about the tragic 
form that invites the tragic vision, and something about the tragic vision that 
moves some of its visionaries, some of the time, to write tragedies (while 
others write music or paint, others do philosophy and still others simply carry 
on with what Unamuno called a tragic sense of life). But there is also 
something about the tragic form that invites the melodramatic "vision" (the 
strong organization of human energy into good/bad polarities), the Satanic, the 
didactic, the ethical, the sentimental and the pathetic, all of which might serve 
as a perspective from which to write a tragedy and yet have little to do with 
a fully tragic vision. For example, I might try my hand at comedy and the 
result, though recognizable as a comedy, may get a few laughs but be far from 
comic; and one of the deficiencies may be precisely that I have no comic vision 
but know only how to string a few jokes together. The same is true for certain 
writers of tragedy who knew only how to string a few deaths together. In the 
1620s William Rowley wrote a play called All's Lost by Lust which contains so 
many gratuitous murders and suicides in the last act that it would be a 
hilarious satire of tragedy if put on the modern stage. To say that Rowley 
wrote a tragedy seems unavoidable; to claim that he was animated by the 
tragic vision is to make a visionary of every hack who has ever cashed in on 
the tragic form. 
Of course one might say, "Yes, but isn't an assumption of 'vision' and 
'high' seriousness implied in our use of the term tragedy? Don't we know a 
tragedy from a goat-song?" This seems to me the main problem: we have 
given tragedy an honorific status in confusing it so easily with vision; and that 
is why we cannot decide whether it is dead or alive: something like it is still 
around, but it doesn't come in the right shape. In my own view I. A. Richards 
is right in saying that tragedy, as a coalescence of vision and form, is one of 
the rarest things in literature3; at any rate, four-fifths of the plays that go under 
the name wouldn't make it to the quarter-finals of a contest in Tragic Vision. 
Only by drawing a distinction between practice and vision can we see that the 
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whole death-of-tragedy debate is based on a questionable premise that equates 
the tragic vision with the form taken by past tragedies. If, like George Steiner, 
you believe that Shakespeare and Racine are the last genuine tragic visionaries 
you will in all likelihood locate the characteristics of tragic structure and effect 
in some sort of a composite "form" based on everything up to your cut-off 
point.4 If, like F. L. Lucas, you believe that tragic vision implies only a "serious 
and true" reading of life, then the form tragedy may take will be virtually 
open-ended and will include everything that is "serious and true," whatever you 
mean by that.5 In any event, as long as vision and form are considered as 
aspects of the same 'thing' past models of tragic structure will always dictate 
one's conception of tragic vision itself, and vice versa~a kind of Procrustean 
bed whirling in a hermeneutic circle. 
Another corollary to this problem is the high risk that any commentary 
so derived will equate the tragic hero and the tragic visionary, as if the 
protagonist were the direct extension of the artist's tragic vision, and when 
heroic and visionary protagonists fall out of the picture "high" tragedy becomes 
impossible. Among other things, such a conflation leads to judgments that 
ignore the cathartic influence of artistic formulation itself, irrespective of the 
vision of the protagonist; so we find such sentiments (eg. Krutch) as, "If 
Pirandello [or Beckett, or Kafka, or Chekhov] believes life is that bad, man 
that poor, why did he bother to write?" which ignore the possibility that the 
representation of suffering may, in certain hands at least, constitute a cathartic 
and artistic "revenge" on the condition itself. Thus there is an entire dimension 
in which the value of tragedy and the tragic vision, when they coalesce-or 
when the vision coalesces with something else—lies not in the "message" of the 
expression or the size of the tragic hero, or in some precarious balance 
between the ethical, the religious and the tragic, but in the power of the artist 
to evoke the tragic condition, however darkly perceived, as unflinchingly as 
possible. We hear a great deal about how "despair" has ruined tragedy, but 
that seems to me a variation of the old argument between the pot and the 
kettle. If the tragic vision was capable of dealing with the deaths of Lear and 
Cordelia it should have no trouble dealing with the more recent death of God 
and all the "despair" that followed that event. Why should we not extend to 
modern tragedy-or, again, certain instances of it—the same motive and 
cathartic power that we extend, say, to Grunewald's Crucifixion which paints 
Christ and the world in which he dies in gruesome detail? Is it our belief in 
Christ's heavenly transcendence that overpowers such dark realism? Or could 
it be Grunewald's own vision-which is to say, his insistence on looking so 
precisely, and darkly, on the event? 
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It is clear that we need some sense of what the term tragic vision may 
mean. The problem, as always in these matters, is that so many people have 
attempted to define "the tragic" and I would like, if possible, to avoid 
privileging one view over another. Moreover, to derive a definition of tragic 
vision from past formulations amounts to spinning in the same hermeneutical 
circle I have just described. My (partial) solution to the difficulty is to look for 
a tendency, based on philosophical formulations, that might be helpful in 
differentiating tragic vision from, say, the religious, ethical or Satanic visions, 
which I take to be tragedy's nearest "visionary" neighbors and the grounds on 
which most of the intermingling takes place. Here I am making a subjective 
judgment already, but I am guided less by a thesis than by a curiosity about 
what a tragic vision would be if we were to determine it on a comparative 
visionary basis and without the influence of tragic practice. In other words, 
one can assume that plays, even those we regard as examples of the highest 
tragedy, are conditioned by, even generically contaminated by, a complex 
cultural motivation that springs from a number of imperatives. One doesn't 
write a play (or a novel) in order to demonstrate the tragic but to say 
something about the face of disaster in a specifically tragic world. To come 
back to religion, there is the religious vision and then there are Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist "faiths," all of which are concrete 
instances of a universal that differs in its "local" directives. The question, then, 
would be: what constitutes the universal of the tragic vision, before it gets put 
into tragic "works" written in and for specific societies? At the risk of being 
rather bland-or Procrustean-I will suggest two foundational propositions that, 
in one way or another, are not accommodated by any other vision. They are 
not my own formulations but persistently underlie conceptions of the tragic 
since Schelling, if not Pascal. They are also deducible from many plays; but 
that is another matter. 
I assume, first, that a tragic vision is an extreme "view" of human 
experience. And by extreme I mean having no further extensibility-if you will, 
an end-of-the-road conception. Here Northrop Frye's idea that "the basis of 
the tragic vision is being in time" might serve as a bottom line. Unfortunately, 
one might also say that the basis of the comic (or any other) vision is "being 
in time," since being and time are pretty much all we've got. But what we 
mean by the phrase~or what Frye means by it-is the "one-directional quality 
of life . . . [wherein] all experience vanishes, not simply into the past, but into 
nothingness, annihilation."6 Or, as Camus's Caligula simply puts it, "Men die 
and they are not happy." The not-happiness may vary in intensity from David 
Reisman's "persistent low-keyed unpleasure" to Munch's shriek, but it is not 
the consequence of a lack of comfort or security in the social world, something 
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somebody does to you or something that could be repaired if taxes were 
lowered or there were equal opportunity for all. It springs from an awareness 
that time and value cannot be called back and the belief that Being has no 
'other' except Nothingness. I do not take this as a cynical, pessimistic or, in 
Murray Krieger's word, "demoniacal" postulate. But why so bleak? Because 
it is the only extremity to be weighed equally against its non-tragic antithesis: 
the possibility that there is a 'next' life or some form of redemption for this 
one. If this were not the case, what need for fictions or philosophy grounded 
in the confrontation with death and the conspicuous absence of redemption? 
Why the ongoing debate about whether The Book of Job, The Eumenides, 
Oedipus at Colonus, or Faust are guided by a tragic vision, on one hand, or by 
some sort of a philosophy of deliverance, on the other? In short, in the tragic 
view something tugs us toward the terminal realization that nothingness is the 
likeliest of two possible extremes in any dialectic on human destiny. Anything 
else could easily be contained within the religious, or some other redemptive 
vision and though such visions often participate in the tragic they avoid the 
extreme consequence of tragic understanding, which is, as Yogi Berra would 
say, that when it's over it's over. 
As a corollary to this first point we should add immediately, via Max 
Scheler, the sense of an absolute indifference in the causal order toward the 
order of human value. Here George Steiner has it absolutely right: tragic 
catastrophe is irreparable, inexplicable, and it has nothing whatsoever to do 
with justice or injustice, either human or divine.7 If there were a direct 
relationship between causality and human value, if there were a clear sense in 
which we all get "what we deserve" in a world with a dependable set of rules, 
there would be no need for tragedy and nothing in life to arouse a tragic 
vision. But this is far from the case. As Scheler puts it, "The simple fact that 
the sun shines on the good and bad alike makes tragedy possible."8 And, we 
might add, 'inevitable as a vision and indispensable as an artistic form. 
The second 'extreme' proposition of a tragic vision is that the visionary 
accepts this basic condition of our "thrownness" into an indifferent world 
without the least suppression, subterfuge, or whimpering. In the tragic view, 
as I. A. Richards puts this point (in a passage quoted by Van Laan): 
The mind does not shy away from anything, it does not protect itself 
with any illusion [of heaven, hell, or God], it stands uncomforted, 
unintimidated, alone and self-reliant. . . . The essence of Tragedy 
is that it forces us to live for a moment without them. (246) 
For the moment any of these various subterfuges appear, we leave the tragic 
vision and enter the religious, the mystical, the pathetic, the ethical, or some 
other sphere. 
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These seem to me the two fundamental and categorical characteristics 
that form the ground of a tragic vision. Beyond them, we may mention at 
least two auxiliary refinements that derive from this base and indeed take us 
closer to the actual practice and form of tragedy itself. First: human beings 
have a tendency, through desire or fear, through a kind of self-momentum 
(that tragedians eventually call hubris or hamartia) to create situations in 
which they inadvertently radicalize the destructive power of the causal series, 
thus distributing the "responsibility" for the tragic condition between individual 
and world. This sense of a causal balance is implicit even in Aristotle, and 
without it the tragic vision immediately becomes indistinguishable from the 
Satanic (whose main postulate is that the world is malevolent, as opposed to 
indifferent). In short, it is a tragic truth that we do, in part, author our own 
fates, and this is one of the factors that allows us to resist giving the name of 
tragedy to natural disasters, to casual or mass slaughter, or to most naturalistic 
plays and novels with social agendas. Second, as a consequence the tragic 
vision, like tragedy itself (usually), implies a certain factor of recognition, or 
awareness--if nothing else, an awareness that each "single and peculiar" life, 
despite the indifference of the causal order, has, after all, its own intelechial 
shape. 
Many theorists who claim that tragedy is dead associate this recognition 
with the principle of "affirmation" and cite its absence from modern works as 
evidence for the death of tragedy; but like Van Laan I can find no quality of 
affirmation in the most profound tragedies-and no reason for assuming it 
should be part of a tragic philosophy. Concomitantly, I suggest that one of the 
main differences between classical and modern tragedy is that the latter is 
more often than not written from the standpoint of recognition (or, if you 
prefer, self-consciousness) rather than that of causality, and this may be one 
reason that its patron saint is Prince Hamlet. However, the principle of 
affirmation, as usually elaborated, seems to me another subterfuge for 
whistling ourselves through the graveyard.9 This is not to equate affirmation 
with nobility in the tragic protagonist. Dying "well" (with honor, courage, 
dignity) is certainly admirable in life and a desired ingredient in the tragic 
hero; but it doesn't change the consequences of tragic fate itself. When 
Horatio speaks of flights of angels singing Hamlet to his rest we take it as a 
metaphor for Hamlet's value to him (and to us) rather than an expression of 
real possibility. Even if Shakespeare personally believed that angels exist, he 
kept the belief out of the play, and in this respect his vision was tragic rather 
than Christian. In any case, affirmation seems as poor a word for what arises 
in tragic catharsis, on the optimistic side, as Schopenhauer's resignation is on 
the pessimistic. Whatever else tragedy may teach us about our virtues and 
capacities, the perception it gives us, when it is the full embodiment of tragic 
vision, is apocalyptic, or the feeling, as Richards puts it so beautifully, that 
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everything is "right here and now in the nervous system"10 and that becoming 
itself has ceased to be a matter of concern. For affirmation, then, we might 
substitute Shakespeare's "readiness" or "ripeness," words that catch the precise 
sense of the finality of our fall from the tree of experience. 
I do not expect every reader to find this description agreeable. But I 
know of no other way to differentiate tragedy as an aesthetic form and tragic 
vision as a philosophical outlook than to make an assertion along some such 
lines. I have tried to be at once as basic and radical as possible (in the sense 
of following implications to the end of the line) and my design was not to 
prepare a measuring instrument that will allow me to prefer some works over 
others according to how well they fulfill my criteria (though that is indeed 
possible). As I say, it is an extreme view of the tragic condition itself-the 
ground of its discontent, one might say—and not necessarily a view that all 
tragic visionaries follow to "the end of the Une." We glimpse it briefly, 
however, in phrases like Lear's "unaccommodated man, "Hamlet's 
"quintessence of dust," and the Greek refrain "Count no man happy. . . ." This 
is not to say that King Lear or Hamlet themselves are so unrelievedly dark, 
only that the "pure" tragic condition is that of a world in which we have no 
compensation, beyond the life lived, for the descent into the dust. Indeed, I 
think it is essential to get over the notion that tragedy is somehow privileged 
over other forms or that it has to be either present or absent. It is not so 
much a category to put things in (or exclude them from) as a noun that is 
always modified by at least one adjective, the adjective standing for the 
standpoint from which the visionary views the condition. There is even a sense 
in which one might say that we make art, in all its forms, in reaction to this 
condition. However, I do feel that such a scheme, even if you wish to alter 
particulars or change the emphasis, has certain advantages. For one thing, it 
gets us past the habit of identifying works as tragic only if they are called 
tragedies arid follow recognizable (ie., traditional) tragic form. We are faced 
with a seeming paradox that is really no paradox at all: that a dramatist who 
possesses a tragic vision does not necessarily write tragedies in the formal 
sense of the term; and a dramatist who writes tragedies does not necessarily 
possess a tragic vision. 
In some respects it is unfortunate that the word tragic must be used to 
describe "tragic" vision because it implies a derivation (in more than the 
etymological sense) rather than an affinity. The central quality of a tragic 
perspective, in its most extreme manifestation, is that it differs from the 
ethical, moral, religious and Satanic perspectives (in their "pure" or extreme 
assertions) in its dual relation to being and disaster. By this I mean simply 
that if ethical, moral or religious violations and assertions instigate a tragic 
situation (and they usually do), they have only secondarily, or "adjectivally," to 
do with the thematic that emerges from the experience (as one might speak 
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of Ibsen's ethical tragedy, Chekhov's pathetic tragedy, or Strindberg's 
psychopathic tragedy).11 As the substantive perspective the tragic always leads 
beyond its social origin in empirical life to the confrontation with nothingness: 
otherwise one could explain King Lear as a play deploring filial abuse of the 
elderly and Macbeth as a moral injunction against manslaughter. If you find 
God during tragic disaster, or if God finds you, or if you die standing up for 
your rights or the rights of others, or some other construction of the superego 
(such as saving the community water supply), your fall isn't tragic~on that 
account anyway—but something closer to divine comedy or heroic or polemical 
drama. George Steiner defines tragedy as: 
that form of art which requires the intolerable burden of God's 
presence. It is now dead because His shadow no longer falls upon 
us as it fell on Agamemnon or Macbeth or Athalie.12 
I am not sure how metaphorically Steiner intends this statement, but if the 
idea is that there must be an operative God or gods in tragedy-of a different 
order from, say, Lukacs's "spectator" God 13--and that when there are none 
about tragedy becomes impossible, then it seems to me another of those 
sentimental claims that ties tragedy once again to the historical cycle: no gods, 
no tragedy.14 In most cases the damage directly rendered by the gods in 
tragedies could as easily have been rendered by human beings. As for their 
being indirectly responsible, Shakespeare speaks interchangeably of the gods 
or of God or of Fortune or Providence and it isn't clear from the plays what 
role any of these things has in the tragedy. The damage is all done by people 
who have good or bad intentions, and the gods are usually brought in as a kind 
of hyperbole for maximizing the scope of disaster, rather like metaphysical 
swearing. And when daemonic power is clearly present—as in Macbeth or 
Death in Venice---we are not quite sure whether it isn't a metaphor for human 
daemonic power, or a way of confusing the distinction between the psychology 
of the protagonist and something infinite, or at least unlocatable, outside of 
him or her. 
However, the moment gods appear on the stage, as in Euripides, the 
metaphysical air goes out of the balloon, and I take this as an indication that 
gods are more believable in tragedies when they stay at home and spectate or 
work through other mortals like priests. Visible or invisible, though, I can't 
see how god-power differs, in purely tragic terms, from the power unleashed, 
for example, by Mme Zachanassian in Duerrenmatt's The Visit, who is after 
all a very rich lady who knows human nature very well. There may be good 
reasons to argue that The Visit isn't a tragedy, or tragic,, but the absence of 
God's shadow doesn't seem a convincing one. Anyway, it is simplistic to claim 
that modern "gods" are no longer divinities but diminished forces like money, 
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greed, jealousy, corporate business, and social phenomena of this sort, and 
therefore tragedy is not possible. For all practical (ie., destructive) purposes, 
the same forces are operating in Shakespeare's world, and if one simply drops 
all the references to the gods or Providence or Fortune the consequences 
would still be wholly believable in terms of human appetite. The point, 
anyway, isn't who or what causes the disaster, but that it is inevitable and 
answerless and god-power, as conceived by creative human playwrights, is 
designed to enhance both effects. 
Ill 
In his final paragraph, Van Laan introduces what he calls a counter-myth 
as a way of freeing tragedy from the myth of its death so that it may "become 
available for reasonably objective study" (29). The proposal is offered 
tentatively as an extension of Murray Krieger's notion that modern tragic 
vision perceives the "Dionysian without the Apollonian" and it views life as 
"unalienated, endlessly and unendurably dangerous, finally destructive and 
self-destructive-in short, the demoniacal."15 Van Laan concludes: 
It is but a small step to use [Krieger's] analysis to conclude that 
traditional tragedy always fell short of the potentialities of tragedy 
and that instead of dying out with the advent of the modern era 
tragedy was not actually born until then. (29) 
This seems a doubtful claim, but it does clear the slate in a Draconian way. 
I would simply propose a semZ-countermyth that would not require that we 
throw out history, like the baby in the adage, with the death-myth. 
Once we are rid of the notion that tragic vision depends on the tragic 
form as its host-that is, once we cease associating the tragic with what 
amounts to an historically derived model (the mythic "median" hero, hubris, 
hamartia, reversal and recognition, and above all, death itself as a consequence 
of 'all of the above')-we have no cause to say that tragic spirit is dead or dying 
or less valuable or less cathartic than that of earlier tragedy. For one thing, 
there is a good possibility that what "purists" may admire in Aeschylus or 
Sophocles or Shakespeare, and find deficient in modern works, has less to do 
with tragic vision, per se, than with a variety of other factors such as aesthetic 
pleasure and the always tempting notion that the grass is always greener 
elsewhere. For example, you might prefer Shakespearean poetry to modern 
household prose, or Greek monumentality to living-room realism, but account 
for the preference by claiming that one was more tragic than the other (when 
what you really mean is that one is more sublime). Again, tragedy tends to be 
the magic word for "high seriousness." 
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The main idea I want to advance, however, is that art undergoes its own 
"biological" evolution as a matter of historical course, and that to pronounce 
a part of it dead or moribund is rather like claiming that Natural Selection is 
killing off a species that is only undergoing an adaptation for its own good. It 
is really a matter of seeing the adaptation in terms of what Darwin referred 
to as the law of the Conditions of Existence which, he maintained, was a 
"higher law" than that of Unity of Type. The latter law refers to "that 
fundamental agreement in structure we see in organic beings of the same 
class"; the former refers to the adaptation of "the varying parts of each being 
to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; or [to] having [been] 
adapted . . . during past periods of time."16 If we can think at all in biological 
terms about species of art, it is surely safe to claim that tragedy has always 
been an evolving form, as HegePs comparison of Greek and "modern" tragedy 
will serve to illustrate. Not being a Naturalist, however, Hegel was unable to 
see wherein such modern "parts" as the emphasis on the subjectivity of the 
hero, ethical relativity, or the rise of guilt as a causal factor may have been 
advantageous tragic responses to "conditions of life" in the renaissance. Suffice 
to say that the "falling off between Antigone and Hamlet must have been as 
radical for Hegel as the falling off between Shakespeare and Pirandello was 
for Joseph Wood Krutch and the "tragedy is dead" group.17 And it seems to 
me that this evolution should be seen in its full implications as just that—an 
evolutionary continuity as opposed to a series of deaths and births. 
To apply Darwin's law, symptomatically, to modern tragedy: what 
modern "conditions of existence" seem to have required, as a probable 
consequence of the Naturalistic and Expressionist revolutions, was a new 
"radical of presentation," in Frye's term,18 that did not call for a flawed or 
excessively committed hero exposed to his or her enemies and driven to the 
point of death (which is also the point of recognition). This, we might assume, 
had become an outmoded "form," suitable only for expressing aspects of "being 
in time" that had since been modified by modern life or, more likely, were no 
longer able to produce energetic "variations"; and where art departs from 
biology is in the persistent social demand for new variations that will prevent 
the disappearance of its types into the "unity" of overfamiliarization, or what 
Brecht called inconspicuousness.19 Thus Darwin was right in using the law of 
the Conditions of Existence to refute "the belief that organic beings have been 
created beautiful for the delight of man" (p. 251); but Samuel Johnson was 
equally right in saying that the drama's laws the drama's patrons give; and we 
might infer that a degree of restlessness must have been setting in among 
artists and audiences at the century's turn with regard to how intrepidly the 
dramatic form was consuming the same kinds of human experience.20 
Perhaps the most notable sloughing off of "parts" was that death-the 
oldest and most venerable fixture of tragedy-came gradually to be regarded 
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as supererogatory to tragic vision, since the subject was now the condition that 
emanates in death rather than the progress toward it through a series of 
contingent and peripetous events.21 (Thus Shaw could argue that Hedda 
Gabier would have been more tragic had Hedda lived on.) How, in short, was 
it possible to deal with the matter of "how it is" if one's available model is 
designed to demonstrate mutability, or "how things come about"? A related 
shift (that might have pleased Hegel) involved the decline of guilt, as 
Durrenmatt put it, as "a personal achievement [or] a religious act" on the part 
of the protagonist.22 When it was relevant at all, guilt was either collective (the 
"guilty society") or, as in the case of Kafka, an inescapable part of the private 
condition. There are many other variations, of course; I concentrate on death 
and guilt (including its variant hubris) because they are the forces between 
which traditional tragedy works itself out. 
Such profound shifts, however, should be regarded less as an alteration 
in vision than as a means of permitting the vision's gravitation to new aspects 
of experience that had been disclosed by (among other things) the 
evolutionary advance of art itself. I am not suggesting that the tragic vision 
remained unaltered in this evolution, only that it remained, by definition, a 
terminal view of existence and what constitutes a terminal preoccupation is 
bound to vary with each era and to be intimately bound in the progress and 
capacity of art to render it without iterating itself to death. Natural Selection, 
Darwin said: 
acts exclusively by the preservation and accumulation of variations, 
which are beneficial under the organic and inorganic conditions to 
which each creature is exposed at all periods of life. (151) 
Or, to put the same idea in the language of modern chaos theory: art and 
language are 
engaged in a feedback loop in which articulating an idea changes the 
context, and changing the context affects the way the idea is 
understood, which in its turn leads to another idea, so that text and 
context evolve together in a constantly modulating interaction 
[Emphasis mine].23 
Thus you can't tell a tragic vision by a check-list of known characteristics; we 
must assume, rather, that it is always adaptable to the changing human scene. 
It is itself, one might say, a shape-shifter, like Proteus in the ancient world or 
the cybernetic robot in the postmodern. But it has one constant preoccupation: 
the extremity of the human situation. 
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The most wholesale mutation of dramatic tragedy in the modern period 
is obviously its so-called "merger" with tragicomedy-or, as many would have 
it, tragicomedy is what "replaced" tragedy on its demise: the King is dead, long 
live his jester! Unfortunately, the assumption usually follows that tragic vision 
was itself lost in the process and that what emerged was an alloy that 
thematically supercharged the comic and emotionally diluted the tragic, 
weighing in equal scale delight and dole, as Claudius might say. In any event, 
a new way of looking at existence. This undoubtedly produced a new strain 
of drama, in many (if not most) cases, but that does not prove the point. I 
could cite many examples of tragicomic form that remained tragicomic in 
vision, or at least non-tragic, but such a list could only parade my own opinions 
and provoke argument on what I consider an irrelevant ground. So I will 
illustrate the point by citing what I take to be the central instance of dramatic 
tragic vision in the post-Ibsen to postmodern era. 
I refer to Samuel Beckett, and most especially (for me) the Beckett of 
plays like Krapp's Last Tape, Not I and Rockaby, the trilogy, and in a more 
discursive way the critical work, Proust. I choose Beckett primarily because he 
is the quintessential case of modern extremity and the theatre has not yet 
caught up with him. What Beckett has managed is nothing less than a 
dissolution of the dialogic form of drama; in his work it is no longer possible 
to make clear distinctions between the lyric, the dramatic and the narrative 
voices. That is not an achievement in itself, but it is what gave Beckett access 
to the deepest privacy of mental experience, nuances of thought that were not 
possible in the Shakespearean soliloquy but may, for all that, have been going 
on in Shakespeare's own mind. In any case, it is not a matter of arguing that 
Beckett's plays are tragedies. But to call his a tragicomic vision because he is 
a "stoic comedian" or has called one of his own plays a tragicomedy is, I think, 
a confusion of form and vision.24 It would be hard to find anybody, including 
Shakespeare, who has stared with greater equanimity into the abyss than 
Beckett has. Unlike any other modern dramatist, he went for "the thing itself," 
in Lear's dreadful term, rather than one of its social or psychopathic 
derivatives and that is why his is the most radical vision of the postmodern era. 
It is also why it seems the darkest. In Beckett the protagonist is no longer 
defined by deeds or by social status (high, low--a/ry!) but by what may be 
called the act of being conscious. His people are post-experiential, all 
anagnorisis-wide-tycd awareness bumping up against its Other, against the 
"not I," as the Unnamable puts it. No reversal is necessary because reversal 
is strictly a function of social experience, or of the deed coming "full circle." 
No death because death is the point of deliverance from both the social and 
the tragic life. More relevantly death is the point where the pen stops, and the 
problem is to "say" oneself in words "as long as there are any." Life in society 
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was somebody else's responsiblity: Beckett's topic was the tragedy of vagitus, 
or (as he might have put it) of is-ness.25 
On the occasion of Beckett's death The Los Angeles Times (December 
27,1989) spoke of how his "bleak poetic and darkly comédie works etched the 
pessimism of the human condition" (1). Beckett died, the article went on, of 
"respiratory failure," a phrase that got my instant attention. I had not known 
about this and, like everyone else no doubt, I was stunned to think what that 
must have entailed, in simple sentient terms alone, and to realize that Beckett 
(whose mortality some of us had doubts about anyway) had finally met the 
thing he had been anatomizing in "words" all his life, respiratory failure being 
only another word for what he called the Time cancer. At any rate, I think 
Beckett would have appreciated the expression, respiratory failure, even as 
applied to his own case. It is one of those scientific phrases he liked so much 
because they carried both a precision of meaning and an unintentional lilt of 
poetry-surgical words, you might call them, that cut without clotting the 
wound with sentiment. You can imagine Krapp hearing the phrase, respiratory 
failure, on one of his tapes, dividing it into syllables, and "revelling" in the 
sound. 
And that is really the point of my anecdote: it is this revelling in the 
sound of words or finding a surreptitious beauty in the names of ugly things, 
or in mundane and obsessive habits (like the mathematics of stone-sucking), 
that rescues his vision from "the pessimism of the human condition" and gives 
new proof to Eric Bentley's claim that "All art is a challenge to despair,"26 as 
opposed to an indulgence in it. For Beckett words were blocks of 
timelessness, a means of making something out of the symptoms of the Time 
cancer that was slightly extratemporal, slightly more immune to the cancer 
than life itself, something, above all, that didn't belong to it but to 
consciousness itself. So if you put your own "fibrous degeneration" or your 
respiratory failure into plays (as he did) it was being put to some use; you 
haven't beaten the Time cancer, but you have, in our reporter's word, "etched" 
your understanding on it, as on the urn that will eventually contain your own 
ashes. 
Unfortunately, the grimness of Beckett's subject tends to obscure the 
lucidity and wit with which he examines this enduring Condition of Existence. 
Many people wish he had been more cheerful about life and I think we tend 
to flaunt his political activism in the war as a kind of assurance that, despite 
everything, he was for "good causes." That apart, however, I can't personally 
see how anyone could read the last ten pages of The Unnamable or witness 
Billie Whitelaw in Rockaby or Not I and claim that tragedy was dead "in our 
time," that this experience was less compassionate and terrifying-less 
cathartic-than the death of Lear. It is one thing to write depressingly about 
depressing things, as the naturalists did, quite another to look at them without 
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consolation, though with a little wink, and try to see what they add up to ("Not 
count!" as Rooney says, "One of the few satisfactions in life!"). It is what 
Beckett called "getting it right" and this has always been the mission of the 
tragic visionary-getting right things that come up in the evolution of a species 
that is incapable of leaving any extremity unexamined, and worrying about the 
form only to the extent that it is the most advantageous one to suit the 
experience. If there is any merit in Van Laan's premise that certain 
"potentialities" of tragedy are only now being "born," it seems to me that the 
Beckett "variation" is, at least temporarily, the most extreme. The problem, 
of course, is whether this particular variation can survive, in any adapted form, 
the death of Beckett himself. Even if not, its appearance should be cause 
enough to review our conception of the tragic and how it continually adapts 
itself to the conditions of experience. 
Santa Barbara, California 
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1. For Krieger, the tragic visionary seems to be the protagonist, not the author. For 
example: if an author "becomes one with his tragic visionary, he so cuts himself off from man's 
communal need that, in surrendering to moral chaos, he surrenders also the only possibility left 
him to impose aesthetic form" (The Tragic Vision, [New York: Holt, 1960] 19). I am using the 
term throughout as referring to the tragic author or philosopher of the tragic vision. 
2. Maxwell Anderson, Off Broadway: Essays about the Theater (New York: William Sloane, 
1947) 50. 
3. I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925) 246. 
4. For example: "Man [must be] ennobled by the vengeful spite or injustice of the gods. 
It does not make him innocent but it hallows him as if he had passed through flame. Hence 
there is in the final moments of great tragedy, whether Greek or Shakespearean or neoclassic, 
a fusion of grief and joy, of lament over the fall of man and of rejoicing in the resurrection of 
his spirit. . . . From antiquity until the age of Shakespeare and Racine, such accomplishment 
seemed within the reach of talent. Since then the tragic voice in drama is blurred or still" (The 
Death of Tragedy [New York: Knopf, 1968]) 10. 
5. F. L. Lucas, Tragedy: Serious Drama in Relation to Aristotle's POETICS (New York: 
Collier, 1962) 66. 
6. Fools of Time (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1967) 3. 
7. The Death of Tragedy 8. 
8. Max Scheler, "On the Tragic," trans. Bernard Stambler, Crosscurrents 4, 2 (Winter 1954) 
184. 
9. If we are referring to affirmation in the sense used by Hans-Georg Gadamer I have little 
trouble with the term: "The spectator recognizes himself and his own finiteness in the face of 
the power of fate. What happens to the great ones of the earth has an exemplary significance. 
The tragic emotion is not a response to the tragic course of events as such or to the justice of 
the fate that overtakes the hero, but to the metaphysical order of being that is true for all. To 
see that 'this is how it is' is a kind of self-knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with new 
insight from the illusions in which he lives. The tragic affirmation is an insight which the 
20 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
spectator has by virtue of the continuity of significance in which he places himself (Truth and 
Method [New York: Crossroad, 1985] 117). 
The use of the term I find cloying is the one claiming that the hero is somehow morally 
bigger than his or her fate by standing up to it "nobly," and that Fate (if it were possible to 
personify it) would go skulking off stage in shame. In sum: tragedy does not contain an 
affirmation, it is an affirmation in the sense that it is an insight into the "metaphysical order of 
being that is true for all." But what else is art itself but such an affirmation? 
10. Principles of Literary Criticism 2A6. 
11. I am not suggesting that Ibsen, Chekhov and Strindberg should automatically be 
classified as tragic visionaries. The question would be: at what point does the adjective (ethical, 
pathetic, psychopathic) overbalance or offset the tragic substantive and become the substantive 
itself, with respect to thematic emphasis? The answer will always depend on one's interpretation. 
Chekhov's is perhaps the most debatable case. David Magarshack finds Chekhov's plays positive 
and forward-looking in their endings (Chekhov The Dramatist [New York: Hill and Wang, 1960] 
262-3). F. L. Lucas, on the other hand, finds "no more really tragic ending in all drama" than the 
ending of Three Sisters (Tragedy: Serious drama in relation to Aristotle's Poetics 66.). Finally, in 
a devastating essay titled "Creation from the Void" Leon Shestov argues that Chekhov is "a 
sorcerer . . . , an adept in the black art [with a] singular infatuation for death, decay and 
hopelessness" that would seem to place Chekhov securely in the category of the Satanic. 
(Chekhov and Other Essays [Ann Arbor, Michigan: U of Michigan P, 1966] 23.). 
As for Ibsen, he is the only one of the three who seems comfortable in what we may 
loosely call the Aristotelian tragic form. But it is possible to argue that ethical concerns 
sometimes get the upper hand in Ibsen and obscure the tragic implications (Pillars of Society, A 
Doll House, Enemy of the People), or that death itself, when it occurs, seems a statement made 
about a world that is potentially curable, or tragic only because people "do such things," as Brack 
says, and not because existence itself is tragic. Finally, much the same might be said about 
Strindberg's sexual vendetta. 
I offer these quibbles, however, not to determine who's in and who's out but as illustrations 
of combinatory possibilities. In practice, the tragic vision necessarily accommodates itself to 
"terrestrial" concerns, often to the point of losing the "terminal" edge I have tried to describe 
here. This is not ground for saying that one dramatist is inferior to another because less tragic, 
but only that dramatists have different agendas, thanks to which we have an infinite variety of 
forms and visions. For example, Pirandello, to offer a somewhat different case in point, sees the 
world as irrevocably tragic in condition (doomed to the communal lie, reciprocal deceit, the falsity 
of language itself, etc.), but chooses to write humorous plays in which the protagonist (a distant 
relative of Prince Hamlet) is aggressively out to prove it to everybody, including the audience. 
What, then, are we to call Pirandello--a polemical tragical-comedian or a comical-tragical-
polemicist? It is all a matter (as I will suggest below) of artistic imagination operating according 
to what Darwin would call the principle of Divergence of Character which is the means by which 
species proliferate the variety of forms in response to conditions in their environment. 
12. The Death of Tragedy 353. 
13. "[God] is a spectator and no more; his words and gestures never mingle with the words 
and gestures of the players. His eyes rest upon them: that is all" (Soul and Form 152). 
14. As an argument to the contrary, I think, offhand, of Buchner's tragedy, Danton'sDeath, 
mentioned only briefly by Steiner as a youthful experimental play that "renews the possibilities 
of political drama" (271). To my mind, it is a strange political play that calls into question the 
motive of politics itself and views history as an accidental and godless rampage of human appetite 
as uncontrolable as the volcano to which it is likened. Perhaps for these reasons Steiner would 
not call it a tragedy, though in connection with Woyzeck he does speak of Buchner's "radical 
extension of the compass of tragedy" (272). 
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